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To David Rawson 
From Alison Des Forges 
Following is a memo that I sent to Greg Craig before Secretary Albright's trip to Rwanda i.u 
December 1997. I said essentially the same thi.ugs i.u a memo to High Commissioner Robinson, so 
I see no need to send that as well. 
I have deleted a section i.ucludi.ug ilames of a variety of people whom I recommended as possible 
interlocutors fo~:.the Secretary and fo1: U.S. diplomats in general. Ifby any chance our Washington 
office sends you the complete memo (these things ·happen), please destroy the section with the 
name$-I found to my great d~ess that my original memo ended up in the hands at least cif 
Gahima (and perhaps others) and I fear that some of the persons suggested by me may have 
· suffered from that mention. 
Hope you enjQy meeting With Catherine. I find her a lively and well-illformed observer--at least on 
. the ea$1:em side of the continent and I suppose she will be the same for your current beat. 
Best, 
~ 
U.S. POLICY IN RWANDA 
Rwandans, as Genernl Kagame makes clear with refreshing candor and feistiness, can and 
will detennine the course of their own affairs. But Kagame and his circle very much want 
international recognition as "new leaders'' and they need international aid to deal with an 
overwhelming. number of problems. Hence they can be swayed by international actors, particulaTly 
by the U.S., clearly the most influential foreign actor on t..he scene. 
Tbe Present Situation 
Despite the dynamic and confident opt:imjsm projected by Kagame, the present situation is 
not hopeful: the leadership is moving towaTd exclusion, not inclusion in the political process; the 
insurgency continues and is growing in poltical strength; the excessive use of force by the military 
goes unchecked; the process of justice moves with a slowness that cannot be explained solely by 
material difficulties; assassinations, disappearances, md numerous le.,ser abuses go uninwstigated 
and uopunished; respected civilian and military leaders have fled the country; and corruption 
flourishes among officials. As a result, the government and even the JU>F itself are losing 
legitimacy, including among former Tutsi supporters. 
When the new government was established in July 1994, it seemed to be a real coalition, 
multi-ethnic, multiparty, including both civilian and military leaders, and representing various 
points of view. Just over a yeaT later, men representing the hard line, more dependent on force 
and less on law, took the ascendant and began excluding from government or marginalizing within 
the government both Hutu of real stature and moderate Tutsi, incluiling at ministerial level: 
Twagiramuogu, Sendashonga, :N'kubito, Nkuliyingoma, Mucegande, Kanyarengwe, Rugenera, 
Birara. At the same time, government soldiers (Rwandan Patriotic Army, RP A) carried out or 
permitted assasstnations or disappearances of administrators at the level of prefect (governor), 
sub-prefect, and burgomaster and of judges and other judicial personnel. More recently, RP A 
soldiers have killed Captain Hategekimana and aTreSted Major Ngirnbatware, important officers, 
re-integn!ted into the RP A from the former government aTmy. In the last few days, govemment 
spokesmen, including President Bizimungu, have suggested that the elections fu.reseen in two 
years may not take place and that even the current structure of the national assembly is no longer 
appropriate. 
Despite optimistic predictions by the government, the insurgency continues. The discovery 
of one insurgent base in the eaves of the northwest was an important victory, but the entire 
northwest is honeycombed with caves and the forests of the region make ideal hiding places as 
well. Even more important than such logistical considerations are the political ones; the 
government does not have most of the people with it. 
Sporadic efforts at winning popullll' ba<;J!Qng are often 1.1ndone by the excessive use offorre 
•he RP A When charged by foreigners with military attacks against civilians, General Kagame 
·ther RP A officers have a set of standard excuses that they have used since 1994: that RP A 
overwhelmed by grief and rage at the genocide, lost control of themselves; that they 
distinguish insurgentS: from noncombattants; that they fired in self-defense; that they 
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themselves, not the RP A, killed the civilians. While foreigners often are--or at least appear to be-
convinced by such excuses, those shot at know that the truth lies elsewhere: that soldiers regard 
them also as the enemy and care little, if at all, about protecting their lives. 
The slow progress of the genocide trials, the result of political indecision as much as of 
. mmmal problems, has cost the government much legitimacy among Tutsi survivors of the 
·genocide as well as among HutU who ru:e accused of the crime. Of the nearly 130,000 now 
imprisoned on charges of genocide, thousands have been falsely accused, either through error or 
as a way to acquire their property or to settle past disputes. 
The failure to try the accused more promptly and the inhumane ronditions of detention 
· contribute to perceptions among Hutu that reprisals, not justice, is the ol:!jective of the judicial 
system. The Ionge~: prisoners are detained in such conditions, the more embittered they become 
and the more time they have to work out an organization among themselves. When released, 
whether by official action, by insurgent attack on the prisons, or by breaking out, they will offer 
an. ideal pool from which to recruit !lllll?d opponents to the government, Insurgents will continue 
to tru:get communal jai1s, ·and eventually central prisons. We have jus! received information that 
prisoners in at least one of the central prisons, encouraged by the insurgents' attacks on the 
communal jails, are putting aside the astonishing docility that bas go\ ·erned their behavior thus fur 
and are beginning to talk about escape plans. With the prospect ofbeing freed or freeing 
themselves by force, many who might otherwise have considered accepting plea bargains will no 
longer do so. 
In scores of cases, RP A or civilians linked with them, have tak:en the lives or pmperty of 
other Rwandans without suffering the least consequence. Soldiers and their associates from the 
start appropriated property of all kinds from those thought to be participants in the genocide or 
enemies of the government, a: pattern they repeated during militru:y operations in the Congo. Wrth 
. the growing flow of foreign as:sistance money to the government, some officials have enriched 
themselves with those funds: Jean Birara, a highly respected technocrat, was recently removed 
from his post as Minister of Plan and Finance in part because of a personal co:flict with President 
Bizimungu. in part beeause· be refused to condone this kind of corruption. The Kigali press, 
including journals close to the government, have publicly criticized these practices. 
· The blatant gap between rich military and civilian officials and the mass of the population 
undermines the legitimacy of the government, including among survivors of the genocide. It is 
particularly tragic to see Tutsi widows struggling to keep their children alive in conditions of 
desperate poverty while government servants go from one luxmy to che next. 
Disillusionment with the RPF is so grave that its backers in the diaspora, those who 
funded its 1990-1994 campaign, wrote a bitter protest in August, 1997 against the "intellectual · 
bankruptcy," "moral declille," "unexplained accumulation of wealth,'. and "lack of accountability 
and arrogance" of the RPF leadership. 
The Iilsurg~ts 
With the elimination of the camps in Zaire and the shadow government housed in them, 
opponents ofthe current government in the diaspora have worked more vigorously to overcome 
their differences-:-many of them the result of difierent positions on the genocide-and to build a 
political structure for the insurgency. If such a structure encompasse.~ men of standing, 
particularly those who had no apparent involvement in the genocide, it may win support ~ong 
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considerable numbers ofRwandans at home and abroad. 
In the first year or two of control, the government progressively eliminated judicial and 
administrative officials who were supposed not completely committed to the new regime, 
sometimes by murdering them, arresting them or causing them to disappear. In more recent 
months, the insurgents have been murdering those officials whom they see as supporters of the 
government. Attacked by both sides, moderates are excluded or exclude themselves from 
government senzice. 
The insurgents are also increasingly resorting to attacks on civilians to enlist their support 
and to force them to ~ against the government. In the end, the ordinary people, terrorized by 
both sides, will have nowhere to go. In such a situation of generalized fear, they will be all the 
more Vulnerable to bate propaganda and to calls for ethnic violence. Should these conditions 
continue, insur;gent leaders will find growing numbers of ordinary people ready to resume the 
genocide. 
A New U.S. Policy 
A new U.S. policy on in.p:Dan rights and justice is necessary to help restrain the ex:tre:inists 
and give renewed hope ai!d courage to moderates in Rwanda. · 
Despite frequent profession of support for human rights and jllstice, the U.S. fails to act 
according to· its ideals in one case after another: inaction in the face of a genocide; acquiescence in 
the former military's misuse of resources and protection meant for genuine refugees in the Congo 
camps; toleration of grave daily abuses-even of massacres--by the current Rwandan government 
both in Rwanda and in the Congo; silence before travesties ofjustice in both the civilian and 
lililitary judicial systems; Jack of support for efforts by international and local human rights and 
· hJ.imaxmarian workers to publicize human rights abuses. 
DepOOdmg on the political view of the Rwandan observers, they will condemn some of 
these failings while ignoring thil others, but all must conclude-whatever their ethnic group or 
political convictions-that in the domains of human rights and justice, the U.S. rarely means what 
it says.· 
To attempt to halt the slide into greater extre:inism and violence in Rwanda, the U.S. must 
insist that a primary policy o~ective is avoiding further massive k:illin gs of civilians and the 
consequent refugee flows in the region. It must consequently disapprove of any excessive and 
abusive military operations that would result in lruge numbers of civi I ian casualities, even when 
provoked by insurgent attacks. The U.S. must insist that the distinction between combattants and 
noncol)lbattants, as established in international law, be observed and that officers and soldiers who 
violate the laws of war be prosecuted in trails with serious prosecutions and appropriate 
punishments. Such a stand can help set the parameters for a struggle which promises to become 
increasingly ruthless and bloody. By finnly establishing such limits, the U.S. may hope to put 
obstacles in the way of hard-liners and to give moderates some leverage in working against them 
from within the system. 
The U.S. must also insist t!lat the Rwandan government pursue political strategies to win 
increased acceptability among its citizens, including by protecting the lives and property of all 
equally. The U.S. must make clearthat its conviction that military repression is neither a 
legitimate nor an effective basis for a stable government. 
Only by adopting a :firmer· stand on human rights and justice can the U.S. expect any 
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·substantial return on its financial investments in these areas. Money spent to make technical 
improvements in the justice system or to teach ~ncep~ ofhum:m ~ghts and justice, whether ~o 
military officers, to judicial personnel, or to ordmary crt_JZ~· will yteld few ~ong-terrn resu1~s !f 
the U.s. government discredits its own lessons by keepmg silent on human tights a?uses. ~imilarly 
· funds invested in strengthening civil society will produce little unless the U.S. also mvests tts 
political capital to insist that nol;-governmental organizations be assv red the space necessary to 
develop their positions, even if they criticize the government. 
Implementing A New U.S. Policy 
The U.S. should exploit the visit of the Secretary of State to make clear the new policy. 
Implementation involves three steps: public statement or statements, questions to Kagame and 
other Rwandan authorities, and contacts with Rwandans who are not part of the current power 
elite. 
Kagante and other Rwandan leaders have always professed their commitment to justice 
and human rights. Occasionally they have acted on these professions, as in ensuring the safe return 
of the majority of :refugees from abroad; in beginning trials for the genocide, albeit slowly and not 
always with necessary guarantees of due process; in improving prison conditions for children and, 
most recently, for former soldiers (ex-FAR) detained at Mu1indi camp; in releasing children, 
elde.rly and infirm detainees; in tolerating the continued presence of foreign human rights 
monitors, boih from the UN and from international human rights groups; in releasing detained 
human rights activists; and in improving its cooperation with the International Tnounal. 
The government may have taken some positive actions as a resu1t of pressures from within 
the country, but, in others, they were apparently responding to U.S. interventions. Rwandan 
leaders do care what U.S. leaders say about their performance. Immediately after the July hearings 
in·the House where Representatives and witnesses strongly criticized the Rwandan govemment, 
the head of one of the intelligence. services tried discreetly to arrange for a visit to Rwanda by 
former Senator Kassebaum, hoping that she could be persuaded to quiet criticism among 
Republicans in Congress. The effort demonstrated a misreading of the realities of Arnericcm 
politics and fulled, but it proves nonetheless that Rwandans listen when powerful Americans speak 
on human rights issiles. 
The Rwandan declarations about human rights and justice as well as the positive steps 
indicating some sensitivity on these issues give an opening for the U.S. to push for more progress 
in transforming rhetoric into .reality. 
The Questions 
Discussions of human rights with Rwandan authorities have too often been limited to 
abstract principles without the reinforcement of concrete discussion of difficult cases. In addition, 
when cases are raised, they are apparently dropped after a brief period of concern. Thus 
· Rwandans have fuund it effective to give much lip service to the ideats, to profess co:O:cem over 
cases raised and. then to simply wait for foreign governments to forget the issue. 
The Secretary of State wou1d indicate a new finnness in policy by going beyond the 
rhetoric to ask detailed questions, indicating that she and her staff valued these issues enough to 
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become informed on the specifics. 
Of course, the embassy and State department staff could supply such any number of such 
questions. The intention to follow through on such matters could best be shown by treating cases 
from some time in the past as well as those more current. 
One area of inquiry should certainly be military abuses and military justice, including 
questions about: 
I) the killings of civilians in recent military operations 
2) the status of investigations about certain egregious cases of massacres in the 
past, up to and includ_ing that at Mahoko market in August 
3) reasons for the obviously weak prosecution and inappropriately light 
_ punishment of officers brought to trial for the massacres at Kibeho in Aprill995 (minimum 2,000 
dead) and at Kanama in September 1995; reasons why there have been no further investigations 
or trials in these cases after those first accused were acquitted of all serious clwges . 
. 4) questions about reports that officers who were supposedly detained, including, 
for example, Col. Ibinglra, charged in the Kibeho massacre, were not actually imprisoned; 
questions about where officers condemned to jail terms for massacres in Ruhengeri in March will 
·serve their terms and if they can be visited by human rights investigators 
5) status of investigations and projected trial date fur the hundreds offormer 
-government soldiers (ex-FAR) now imprisoned on accusation of genocide 
6) numbers of civilians now detained in military facilities, numbers of civilians tried 
by military courts, and results of such trials 
Questions on other human rights issues could include tbe status of investigations into: 
1) the attack that killed three Spanish and severely wounded one American staff of 
Doctors ofthe Wodd (the American had to have his leg amputated) 
2) the murder of five staff members of the UN Human Rights Field Operation 
3) the assassinations of important government officials, for example, Prefect of 
Butare, Pierre-Claver Rwangabo, sub-prefect Placide Kolonyi, and the Vice-President of the 
Supreme Court 
4) the disappearance of former judge and human rights activist Innocent 
Murengezi 
5) the interrogation and/or detention of human rights activists Emmanuel 
Hitimana, Andre Sibomana, and Rosalie Mukarukaka and the search of the offices of the 
Association fur the Defense ofHuman Rights and Public Liberties 
· An additional important question on political rights would be the significance of recent 
declarations ofPresident Bizimungu and others indicating reservations about a commitment to 
elections and to continuing the present structure of the national allserr!bly. 
Contacts 
As a matter of principle, the U.S. advocates dealing respectfuUy with members of the 
political opposition, persons of all ethnic groups, and members of civil society. But, in practice, 
important U_S __ representatives too frequently limit their contacts to Tutsi and RPF members of 
government. The Secretary of State would convey a new direction iD American policy simply by 
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insisting on seeing persons outside the narrow group that usually pre-empts fureign visitors. In 
addition, she and her staff would bave the opportunity to acquire new and broader perspectives on 
the current situation. 
A decision to adopt a :firmer, more consistent policy on human rights and justice would be 
well launched by this plan of public declaration, astute guestioning on concrete cases, and 
contacts with 1 Rwandans outside the governing elite. 
For the policy to have real impact, it would require persistent follow-through by embassy 
staff as well as coordinated, long-tenn action with other donor nations. 
